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Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission and the Problem of
Federal-State Conflict
The subject of this note is the extent to which the Federal Power
Commission has been permitted to abrogate state law and policy in
granting licenses for hydro-electric projects. This subject is but a
single part of the tremendously complex problem caused by our
federal system of government as it attempts to manage and conserve
our water resources. The problem, with its political, social, legal,
administrative, and economic ramifications, is due to grow more acute
as the competing demands for water increase. Thus, although most
of the major cases discussed in this paper arose in the Western states,
the problem of federal-state conflict is not limited to that region;
it broached itself in litigation there first only because of the intense
demands for water. For purposes of organization, this article is divided
into five major sections: the background of the Federal Power Com-
mission and the general scope of its jurisdiction, the expansion of the
Commission's jurisdiction and the concomitant overriding of state
policy, a detailed discussion of a recent conflict between the Commis-
sion and state law, the consequences of federal expansion and abroga-
tion, and the need for the protection of state interests.
I. BACKGROUND AND JURISDICTION OF FPC
The Federal Water Power Act of 19201 was the first major step in
the establishment of a national policy for the development of water
power on navigable streams.2 In 1930, an independent Commission
was created to administer the Federal Water Power Act, and in 1935,
the Federal Power Act4 was passed, incorporating the provisions of
the Federal Water Power Act and authorizing the Commission to
regulate the interstate sale and transmission of electricity.5 These acts,
establishing the powers and duties of the FPC and setting up its
administrative machinery, remain basically unchanged today.6 Sub-
chapter I of the Federal Power Act7 creates the Federal Power Coin-
1. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). For a discussion of the Supreme Court cases delineating
Congress's authority over navigable streams and its power to require licenses thereon,
see Note, 60 CoLUm. L. REV. 967, 978-79 (1960).
2. Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 9, 19 (1945).
3. The Reorganization Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 797 (1930).
4. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1964).
5. Pinchot, supra note 2, at 20.
6. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1964).
7. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1964).
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mission and establishes its licensing powers; sub-chapter II8 provides
for the regulation of electric utility companies engaged in interstate
commerce; sub-chapter III 9 establishes certain administrative and
procedural practices to be followed by the Commission; and sub-
chapter IV'0 exempts state and municipal water conservation facilities
from certain requirements of the act. The licensing and regulatory
jurisdiction of the Commission extends to public lands and reservations
of the United States, to all navigable waters," a phrase that, as will be
seen later, has become something of a term of art, and to projects on
non-navigable streams that would affect the interests of interstate or
foreign commerce. 12
Although the FPC is not a multi-purpose agency for the develop-
ment of water resources,'3 i.e., it does not have plenary jurisdiction
for planning and development over all waters to which Congress's
power under the commerce clause extends, it does perform certain
general planning functions. 4 With the aid of its scientists and engi-
neers the Commission conducts comprehensive studies relating to
water use and power development in its physical, geographical, and
economic aspects. Prospective demands for power development are
analyzed, demographic factors are considered, and cost studies are
made. The staff also makes studies for the comprehensive develop-
ment of river basins.15 The licensing powers of the Commission are
tied in with its planning functions; a license is to be granted only when
the project is in the national interest and will further a comprehensive
8. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)-(h) (1964).
9. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 825(a)-(u) (1964).
10. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 828(a)-(c) (1964).
11. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1964). Section
796(8) defines navigable waters as "those parts of streams or other bodies of water
over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States, and which either in their natural or
improved condition notwithstanding interruptions between the navigable parts of such
streams or waters by falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are used or
suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property in interstate or foreign
commerce, including therein all such interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids, together
with such other parts of streams as shall have been authorized by Congress for improve-
ment by the United States or shall have been recommended to Congress for such
improvement after investigation under its authority."
12. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 817 (1964).
13. In fact, the FTC must share its power and responsibility for the development of
water resources with several other federal agencies, among which are the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Geological Survey, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Army Corps
of Engineers, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Public Health Service. See
Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAWv & CON I p. PnOn.
325, 337 (1957).
14. Gatchell, The Role of the Federal Power Commission in Regional Development,
32 IowA L. REv. 283, 287 (1947).
15. ibid.
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plan for the development of water power in a particular region.16
The draftsmen of the act desired cooperation rather than conflict
between the Commission and state agencies and provided for this
cooperation in several areas. 17 But more than just cooperation was
intended: the act expressly preserved certain state-created rights 8
and seemingly required applicants for a license to show that they had
complied with state law.' 9 These two sections are central to the issues
discussed in this paper and warrant full quotation. The section
"saving" state created rights (hereinafter referred to as section 27)20
states:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or
intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective
states relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein.
The section requiring evidence of compliance with state law, section
9 (b), states that the applicant must present.
Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the require-
ments of the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project
is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation,
diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with respect to the
right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing
power, and in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a
license under this chapter.
2 1
This provision is part of a section requiring that the applicant for a
16. Id. at 285. The author of this article, writing in 1947, goes on to say that the
FPC, in granting a license, is careful to consider factors other than power development.
To support this, he cites instances where the Commission has refused to permit power
development because of possible detrimental effects on municipal water supplies,
,where it has required the maintenance of high reservoir levels for recreational use,
and where it has required the construction of fish hatcheries and a flow adequate to
sustain fish life. Id. at 291-92. Subsequent developments, however, seem to support
the proposition that whenever the need for power development is conclusively shown
a license will be granted, regardless of competing demands upon the particular stream
involved.
17. Section 800 gives preferences to states and municipalities in the issuance of
licenses; § 812 provides that licensees that- produce electricity shall be subject to the
rates and regulations established by state agencies; § 824(h) provides for cooperation
between the Commission and state agencies with regard to administrative matters and
for the free exchange of information between them.
18. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1964).
19. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1964).
20. This provision of the act is § 821 in the 16 U.S.C. compilation, but it is § 27
of the old Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 1077, and is generally
referred to as section 27. This terminology will be retained here. Section 802(b) of the
16 U.S.C. compilation is generally referred to as § 9(b), its section number in 41
Stat. 1063, 1068; this terminology will also be retained.
21. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1964).
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license furnish certain information to the Commission. z2
II. ExPrSiON OF FPC's JURISDICTMoN AND CONSMuCrION-
SEMCTONS 9 (B) AND 27
A. Navigable Waters Redefined
The judicial expansion of the FPC's jurisdiction has come about
primarily through the broadening of the concept of navigable waters.
As this concept has been broadened, it has carried with it the
jurisdiction of the Commission and all the incidents thereof, includ-
ing the federal power of eminent domain.23 The major case in this
broadening process was the New River case.24 There, the United
States sought to enjoin the respondent power company from building
and operating a hydro-electric dam on the New River without a
license. The respondent contended that at the site where it wished
to build its dam, the New River was not navigable; therefore, the
FPC was without jurisdiction to require a license and the United
States without power to enjoin its operations.5 The Supreme Court
abandoned the traditional test of navigability in fact,26 and held that
a river is navigable within the meaning of the constitutional cases
defining navigability and within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission if it can be rendered suitable for commerce and trans-
portation by reasonable improvements, the time when the waterway
will be needed for commerce and cost of the improvements determin-
ing the reasonableness thereof.27 The Court went on to state that
the federal government has plenary power over navigable waters; the
states and private parties hold riparian rights in navigable streams
subject "to the power of Congress to control the waters for the
22. Sub-section (a) requires information concerning engineering and construction
specifications. Sub-section (c) provides that the applicant must furnish such additional
information as the Commission may require.
23. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1964). With
this power a licensee may acquire any property needed for the licensed project that
cannot be obtained by other means.
24. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), rehearing
denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941), petition denied, 317 U.S. 594 (1942).
25. Id. at 401.
26. This test was established in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
27. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., supra note 24. "A waterway,
otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from that classification merely because
artifical aids must make the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation
may be undertaken. Congress has recognized this in § 3 of the Water Power Act by
defining 'navigable waters' as those 'which either in their natural or improved condition'
are used or suitable for use. The district court is quite right in saying there are
obvious limits to such improvements as affecting navigability. These limits are neces-
sarily a matter of degree. There must be a balance between cost and need at a
time when the improvement would be useful." Id. at 407-08.
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purpose of commerce." Since the United States has the power to
exclude all structures from navigable streams, it may condition their
erection upon a license.28 The effect of this decision was to give the
United States-through the Commission-plenary power over naviga-
ble streams, as newly defined, though the purpose behind the
exercise of the federal power need not necessarily be the improve-
ment or protection of navigation.
29
The New River decision was further implemented in the Seventh
Circuit by a case which held that the Wisconsin River was navigable
within the meaning of the Federal Power Act, despite the obstruction
of falls and rapids, because in the past the river had been used at
high water to transport logs to market, though it was not being so
used at the time in question.
30
B. Construction of Section 27
Section 2731 of the FPA is really not the "saving" clause that it
appears to be. The protection given to state-created rights is in
part illusory. In Portland General Electric Co. v. FPC,32 it was held
that section 27 is a general provision preserving state law; it cannot
override specific provisions of the act or be used to defeat its general
purpose. Moreover, section 27 does not grant an absolute protection
to state-conferred water rights, it merely requires the FPC licensee
taking those rights to compensate the holder thereof.3 Thus, in opera-
tion, section 27 merely complements the FPA provision granting* the
federal eminent domain power to licensees.4 It should be noted that
with this eminent domain power a licensee can condemn not only
state-created water and property rights, but also property previously
dedicated to public use; otherwise, the purpose of the act would be
28. Id. at 423-24; citing United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co-, 174 U.S. 690
(1899).
29. Scott, Is Federal Control of Water Power Development Incompatible with State
Interests?, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 631, 641 (1941).
30. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FPC, 147 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 880 (1945).
31. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
32. 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964). In this case, as a condition to granting a license,
the Commission, acting pursuant to § 11 of the FPA, required the applicant to
install facilities for the protection of naviagation. The applicant alleged that the
construction of the required facilities would necessitate that certain state-created
property rights be destroyed and argued that under § 27, the Commission could not
require such a destruction.
33. Id. at 167. In support of this proposition the Court -cited City of Fresno v.
California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963) and Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S.
275 (1958). Both are cases construing § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat.
390, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1964), which is practically identical to § 27 of the FPA; the
analogous construction is probably sound.
34. See Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
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frustrated by the existence of state lands that stood to be innundated
or damaged by a proposed hydro-electric project.
35
Although section 27 requires that state-conferred rights may not
be taken without compensation, it is now settled that this requirement
is not to be vitiated by the navigation servitude, which, in the absence
of restrictive legislation, permits state-created rights in navigable
waterways to be taken by the federal government without compensa-
tion, the fifth amendment to the contrary notwithstanding.6 The
Niagara Mohawk case37 held that although certain usufructuary rights
recognized by New York were within the scope of the navigation
servitude, they were not abrogated by the mere passage of the FPA.
The United States may not exercise its dominant servitude to the
detriment of pre-existing rights under state law without clear authori-
zation from Congress, and not only is there no such authorization
given by the FPA, but the references in section 27 to pre-existing
water rights carry a strong implication that Congress intended that
those rights should survive, at least until taken over by purchase or
otherwise.38 "Riparian water rights, like other real property rights, are
determined by state law. Title to them is acquired in conformity
with that law. The Federal Water Power Act merely imposes upon
their owners the additional obligation of using them in compliance
with that Act."
3 9
C. Construction of Section 9(b)
In order to secure passage of the Federal Water Power Act, many
compromises had to be made, and, as a result, parts of the act were
left ambiguous.40 One such part was section 9(b) in which the exact
spheres of state and federal operation were not sharply. defined,4' but
were left for judicial determination. In 1946, section 9(b) received
35. Missouri ex rel Camden County v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 42 F.2d
692, 698 (W.D. Mo. 1930).
36. Note, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 967, 978-80 (1960). See, e.g., United States v.
Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). The theory underlying this taking without compen-
sation seems to be that state-conferred water rights in a navigable stream are never
vested, but are at all times subject to the superior navigation servitude of the federal
government, Note, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 967, 980 (1960).
37. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954). The issues in this
case arose from a determination of the respondent's amortization reserve liability
under § 10(e) of the act. Respondent contended for a lower figure because it had
paid some $700,000 for the use of private proprietary rights on the Niagara. The
Commission asserted that these funds should be counted as surplus because the FPA
and the respondent's license thereunder abrogated' the private water rights under
state law. 347 U.S. at 244-45.
38. Id. at 246-52.
39. Id. at 252.
40. Comment, 46 CoLt r. L. REv. 837, 838 (1946).
41. Ibid.
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a definitive construction in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Corp. v. FPC.42
In that case, the FPC, on grounds of non-compliance with section
9(b), dismissed the co-op's application for a license because it had
not obtained a permit required by Iowa law. Because of an Iowa
statute concerning stream diversion, it appeared that the co-op
would never be able to obtain a state permit and at the same
time comply with the diversion and construction plans approved
by the FPC.43 The Supreme Court stated that to allow Iowa to
exercise a veto power over a federal project by requiring a permit
would be to subordinate to the control of the state the comprehensive
planning which the act provides shall depend upon the judgment of
the FPC.44 The Commission need only require the presentation of
evidence that, to its satisfaction, the applicant has complied with "any
of the requirements for a state permit on the State waters ... that the
Commission considers appropriate to effect the purposes of a federal
license on the navigable waters of the United States."45 Section 27,
the Court noted, is the "saving" clause for the states.46 As distin-
guished from section 27, 9(b) is merely informational, and absolute
compliance therewith is not a condition precedent to the granting of
a license.47 In an interesting part of the opinion, the Court states that
the FPC recognizes a dual system of control-a duality between two
cooperating agencies, each with final authority in its own sphere.
This duality does not require both agencies to share in the final
decision of the same issue.48 Although the Court never delineates the
boundaries of the sphere in which the states shall have final authority,
it is quite clear that permits conditioned upon compliance with state
laws that conflict with FPC licenses are not within that sphere: "The
detailed provisions of the Act providing for the federal plan of regula-
tion leave no room or need for conflicting state controls."49
42. 328 U.S. 152, rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 879 (1946).
43. Id. at 157-62. The co-op filed with the FPC an application for a license to
construct a dam on the Cedar River near Moscow, Iowa. The Cedar flows into the
Iowa and the Iowa into the Mississippi. Under the proposed plan of construction and
diversion, all but about 25 c.f.s. of water from the Cedar would be taken at Moscow,
and this would correspondingly reduce the flow of the Iowa. The diverted water
would enter the Mississippi about twenty miles north of its present entry at the mouth
of the Iowa. After extended hearings, the FPC found that the proposed plans of
construction and diversion were suitable and constituted an adequate utilization of the
resources under consideration. At that point, the State of Iowa intervened with the
argument that the co-op had not complied with section 9(b) in that it had not
obtained a permit from the State Executive Council of Iowa. The FPC then dismissed
the co-op's petition.
44. Id. at 164.
45. Id. at 167.
46. For the extent to which this statement must now be qualified, see p. supra.
47. First Iowa Elec. Co-op. v. FPC, supra note 42, at 175.
48. Id. at 168.
49. Id. at 181.
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The rationale of the First Iowa case is applicable not only where the
Commission is relying upon the "navigable waters" power for its
jurisdiction, but also where it bases its jurisdiction upon the "reserved
and public lands" power. In the Pelton Dam case,50 a private power
company applied for a license to build and operate a hydro-electric
project on the Deschutes River, a concededly non-navigable stream.
Both the eastern and western termini of the dam were to be located
on lands of the United States that had been reserved for power
purposes since at least 1913. The State of Oregon objected to the
granting of the license upon two grounds: (1) The FPC was without
authority to grant the license, and (2) the proposed project would
have deleterious effects upon the anadromous fish in the Deschutes
River, and the applicant had not obtained a permit from the state
fish commission. After finding that there was a severe power shortage
in the Pacific Northwest and that the project was consistent with the
comprehensive development of the Deschutes River and the Columbia
River Basin, the Commission granted the license.51 The Supreme
Court held that the Commission's jurisdiction was based upon the
constitutional power of Congress over United States property, 2 since
the dam was to be built on United States reservations. To allow a
state to veto such a project would be to allow a result precluded by
First Iowa. To Oregon's contention that the Acts of July 26, 1866,5
3
July 9, 1870,5 and the Desert Land Act of 1877,55 had delegated to the
state the power to establish vested water rights on the property in
question, the Court answered that those acts delegated only the
power to prescribe water rights on public lands, not on reserved
lands; and the Property upon which this project was to be built was
reserved land, i.e., it was not subject to sale or disposition to private
parties. 56 The Court also found that the Commission had conditioned
the license upon construction of facilities designed to conserve the
anadromous fish and that these conditions seemed adequate under the
circumstances.
5 7
50. FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
51. Id. at 440.
52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
53. 14 Stat. 253 (1866), 43 U.S.C, § 661 (1964).
54. 16 Stat. 218 (1870), 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
55. 19 Stat. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
56. FPC v. Oregon, s-upra note 50, at 448.
57. Id. at 452. This decision raised a chorus of critical voices in the West. The
primary criticisms were: (1) the First Iowa rationale should not have been trans-
ported into the Pelton situation-the congressional power over non-navigable streams
flowing through federal property is of a different nature from the congressional power
over navigable waters; (2) the distinction made between public lands and reserved
lands was unwise; and (3) the United States should have been treated like any
other proprietor along the banks of the Deschutes, and as such it would have been
subject to any pre-existing appropriative rights created by state law. Munro, The Pelton
Decision: A New Riparianism, 36 ORE. L. REv. 221, 244-45 (1957).
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III. RECENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FPC AND STATE LAW--
THE CowLrrz PROJECT
The purpose of discussing in detail this recent conflict between state
law and the Commission is to show the types of state interests that
have been abrogated when licenses are granted, the way in which
those interests have been asserted, both before the Commission and
in the courts, the national policies relied upon in opposing those
interests, and the protracted and obviously expensive litigation neces-
sary to establish the supremacy of federal policy and the abrogation
of state law and policy.
In 1948, the City of Tacoma filed with the FPC an application for
a license to construct a power project, including two dams and
appurtenant facilities, on the Cowlitz River.58 At the hearing to de-
termine whether the license should issue, the State of Washington
interverned with a petition alleging that the proposed dams would
destroy valuable state fisheries; that a Washington statute requires
the State's permission to construct any dam for the storage of ten
acre-feet or more of water and that such permission had not been
obtained; that a Washington statute prohibits the construction of any
dam higher than twenty-five feet on any tributary to the Columbia,
downstream from the McNary Dam and within the migratory range
of anadromous fish; and that the proposed dams would inundate a
state-owned fish hatchery.59 On November 28, 1951, the Commission
granted the license.60 The state then petitioned for a review of the
Commission's order by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.61
That court62 upheld the Commission's findings that the 'city had
shown satisfactory compliance with state law "insofar as [is] necessary
to effect the purpose of a license for the project," and that the proposed
project was consistent with the comprehensive power development of
the region and was needed to alleviate a projected power shortage in
the area.6 The court did, however, seem to indicate that there might
be valid state restrictions upon the city's capacity to act under the
license once it was granted. An indebtedness limitation was men-
tioned as an example. The state's primary objection concerned the
destruction of its fish resources and fish hatchery and the non-
58. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 324 (1958). A full history of the
controversy is given in this opinion.
59. Id. at 325.
60. Re City of Tacoma, 92 P.U.R. (n.s.) 79 (1951).
61. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, supra note 58, at 328.
62. Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
63. Id. at 394.
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compliance with its laws designed for their protection. 4 The court
countered this objection by relying upon First Iowa and stating that
the Commission had acted within its discretion in not requiring
absolute compliance with state law. "If the dams will destroy the
fish industry of the river, we are powerless to prevent it.""5 The
Commission's order was affirmed.
While the petition for review of the Commission's order was
pending in the Ninth Circuit, the City of Tacoma brought an action
in the Superior Court of Pierce County, Washington, against the tax-
payers of Tacoma and the Directors of Fisheries and Game for a
declaratory judgment establishing its right to issue bonds in order to
finance the Cowlitz Project. After a great deal of procedural skirmish-
ing (during which time the Court of Appears decision was rendered),
the trial court held that the question of the city's power to condemn
the state fish hatchery was settled by the Court of Appeal's decision,
but it enjoined the city from continuing with the project because it
would unnecessarily impede navigation on the river in violation of a
Washington statute. Tacoma appealed this decision to the Supreme
Court of Washington.
The Washington Supreme Court saw the issue as whether a
municipal corporation, created by the state of Washington, has the
power to condemn lands already dedicated to a public use (the
fish hatchery), and, if not, can the federal government endow it with
such power?66 Both questions were answered in the negative. The
court held that the Washington state legislature had not authorized
cities to condemn lands already dedicated to public use, and, in the
absence of such authorization, a city, a creature of the state, cannot
condemn such lands. On the issue whether the federal government
could endow the city with the power to condemn public lands, the
Court of Appeals decision was held not to be res judicata. First Iowa
was construed as meaning only that a state could not prohibit a project
licensed by the FPC when the subject matter of the state statutory
prohibitions was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal
government. The instant case is distinguishable on the ground that
here there is no statutory prohibition, but rather a lack of state
statutory power in the city. "The Federal government may not confer
corporate capacity upon local units of government beyond the
capacity given them by their creator, and the Federal Power Act, as
64. The state offered persuasive evidence that the ladders that were to be used to
get the fish around the dams and upstream to their spawning areas were too high
and that the dams would destroy the fish coming downstream. This would severely
reduce the number of salmon and trout spawning in the Cowlitz and would destroy
the fishing industry along this part of the river. Id. at 398.
65. Ibid.
66. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957).
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we read it, does not purport to do so."6 7 The-injunction was affirmed.68
The United States Supreme Court, having granted certiorari in
order to review the Washington court's decision,6 9 stated that the
United States Courts of Appeal have exclusive jurisdiction to review
FPC orders;70 and subject to review by the Supreme Court, their
decisions are final. In the Court of Appeals, the state had expressly
presented the argument that the city would have to flood state-owned
property; the Court of Appeals was not persuaded by this argument
and its decision on the matter was final. It was further held that the
Court of Appeals' holding on the point was improperly subjected to
collateral attack in the present state suit. Therefore, the decision
affirming the injunction was improper.
7 1
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL ABROGATION
One of the most significant results of the developments discussed
above is that the FPC now has jurisdiction over almost every stream of
any consequence in the United States.72 The Commission may choose
not to exercise its power over all the streams within its jurisdiction,
but this does not change the scope of its permissible jurisdiction or
67. Id. at 799-800, 307 P.2d at 576-77.
68. The Washington court stated that the trial court should not have based the
injunction on the interference with navigation because state laws protecting navigation
bad been clearly abrogated by First Iowa, but since the injunction was sustainable
upon another ground, the lower court was affirmed. Id. at 800, 307 P.2d at 577.
69. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 355 U.S. 888 (1957).
70. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824(1) (6) (1964).
71. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, supra note 58, at 335-41. Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred, but said that the FPA did not give the Commission the authority to deter-
mine issues of state law. Id. at 341.
A more recent chapter in the story of the Washington Supreme Court's running
battle with the FPC is the boundary dispute. In this controversy, the city of Seattle
was granted a license by the FPC for a hydro-electric project, the construction of
which might necessitate the condemnation of property belonging to a public utility
district. Such a condemnation was contrary to a Washington statute. The Commis-
sion's order was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where
it was affirmed. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 v. FTC, 308 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 956 (1963). Meanwhile,
Beezer, a Seattle taxpayer, brought an action in a Washington trial court to have the
city enjoined from the expenditure of funds upon a project, which, under state law,
it could not complete. The trial court steadfastly refused to make a determination of
state law, relying first upon the Supreme Court decision in the Cowlitz dispute and
then upon the Court of Appeals decision in the instant controversy. Finally, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to proceed
with a determination of state law. The Washington court felt justified in doing this
because it believed that the United States Supreme Court had not ruled on its
holding in the Cowlitz dispute that the federal government could not endow a
municipality with powers beyond those given it by its creator, the state. Beezer v.
Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 569, 383 P.2d 895 (1962). This decision was reversed per
curiam by the United States Supreme Court. Seattle v. Beezer, 376 U.S. 224 (1964).
72. King, Federal-State Relations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U. DET.
L.J. 1, 4 (1959).
1965] 1857NOTES
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
restrict the threat to state interests. Although the Federal Power Act
indicates that applicants for a license to construct and operate a
hydro-electric project must show compliance with state law73 and
that certain state-created rights are to be saved,74 it is now settled that
the federal licensing may be done in violation of state law75 and that
the "saved" water rights may be taken if compensation is given
therefor 6 The FPC has been permitted to wholly preempt the power
licensing field 7 with the abrogation of state law that this implies,
and it has also been permitted to disregard state conservation in-
terests.7 8 This movement toward federal aggrandizement in the
control and development of water resources is not peculiar to the
FPC alone. It is a movement that seems to have affected all federal
agencies concerned with water resources and to have grown with
increasing momentum in recent years, impetus coming from the
recognition that planning for maximum development of water re-
sources must be done on a large scale and that many of the problems
are not amenable to local resolution.79 But the activities of the FPC
have caused more interference with state water law than those of any
other federal agency. Moreover, it has been alleged that the cases
permitting the FPC to override state laws seem to have encouraged
other federal agencies to act in disregard of state law and policy 0°
It is too early to determine with any degree of precision the
cumulative effect of these developments upon state planning for
water use and allocation. It seems apparent, however, that the effect
can be nothing but detrimental. Federal judgment and policy have
been substituted for that of the states, even though a particular state
may have a comprehensive plan for the development of its streams
and a multi-purpose agency to carry out that plan. If the judgment of
the FPC as to the wisdom of a particular hydro-electric project runs
counter to a state plan or the judgment of a state multi-purpose
agency, it is only too clear which must prevail. The Commission
could, for example, by withholding licenses, impede a state plan for
73. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1964).
74. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1964).
75. King, supra note 72, at 19.
76. Portland General Elec. Co. v. FPC, supra note 32.
77. Martz, the Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN. L, Rnv.
626, 638 (1957). The extent to which this preemption has occurred is well illustrated
by State v. Idaho Power Co., 211 Ore. 284, 312 P.2d 583 (1957). There the Oregon
Supreme Court dismissed an indictment brought against the power company for not
obtaining a state permit on the ground that a federal license had been obtained, and
this was sufficient to make the state requirement superfluous.
78. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, supra note 58.
79. Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation and Utilization
of Water Resources, 86 U. PA. L. Rnv. 274, 286 (1938).
80. Towner, The Role of the State, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 725, 739 (1957).
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power development, or for comprehensive development of any kind.8'
This possibility of the substitution of the judgment of a single federal
agency for that of a multi-purpose state agency is unfortunate because
at the federal level there is no organizational machinery for coordi-
nated planning and for the reconciliation of conflicting water uses.82
This causes hit and miss development of water resources and jurisdic-
tional conflicts. The statutes defining the functions of national
agencies have compartmentalized responsibility along the lines of
particular water uses, thereby precluding multi-purpose planning by
a single federal agency.83
The effects of the Pelton Dam decision4 upon the states have been
decried by several writers and deserve special mention. It will be
remembered that the reserved lands in that case had been reserved
subsequent to the passage of the Desert Land Act. Thus, there
appears to have been an implicit holding that the water rights that
had been established by the states under the act can be extinguished
without compensation by a subsequent reservation of the lands in
question by the United States.85 Also, once the United States has
reserved the riparian property, no further water rights may vest
against the government. This will tend to discourage property
owners from expending labor and capital on developing appropriation
rights in streams affected by the reservation as well as to discourage
the states from including such streams in any part of a comprehensive
plan.86 A question seems to exist concerning the extent to which the
FPC license guarantees the Pelton licensee, or any similarly situated
licensee, the amount of water necessary for its project in the face of
a state agency determination that the water is needed for other uses
such as irrigation or domestic consumption. 7 It is likely that this
question will be settled in favor of the licensee on the ground that
the reservation of the land carried with it an implied reservation of
the amount of water necessary to develop the reserved land in the
intended manner.8 8 The conclusions concerning the disruptive effects
81. Id. at 741.
82. Note, 56 YALE L.J. 276, 281-82 (1947). A multi-purpose planning agency,
for purposes of this article, is one that takes into account all of the various uses to
which a river or river basin-can be put-power, consumptive, recreational, industrial, fish
and game conservation, and irrigational-and attempts to strike a balance between these
competing and often exclusive uses.
83. Ibid. See also note 13 supra.
84. FPC v. Oregon, supra note 50.
85. Comment, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 400, 402 (1956). For an excellent discussion of
the possible theories of federal "ownership" of the stream, see Note, 60 COLUm. L.
REv. 967, 989-92 (1960).
86. Note, supra note 85, at 995.
87. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill
of 1957, 45 CALnF. L. REv. 604, 610-11 (1957).
88. Note, supra note 85, at 995-96.
18591965] NOTES
1860
of the Pelton Dam decision upon state water law may be summarized
as follows: (1) it deprived the seventeen western states of effective
control over the waters necessary for irrigation; (2) it confused the
status of water rights supposed to exist in private, municipal, and
corporate users; and (3) it brought into existence a new doctrine of
riparian rights by introducing the concept of residual federal water
rights based upon ownership of land.89
In defense of the Pelton Dam decision, it has been pointed out that
most of its critics are concerned with the possibility of the uncompen-
sated taking of vested private rights; yet, Pelton itself did not deal with
private rights, and any fears concerning such rights must perforce
be based upon inferences °0 Moreover, since that decision, no case
has arisen involving the uncompensated taking of private vested rights
under similar circumstances.91 California has long recognized that the
United States is the owner of the waters running through public lands
and that any right to appropriate water on the public lands of the
United States was not derived from the state 2 Thus, the situation
in California for eighty years has been that an appropriator on private
land secures no rights against a subsequent patentee of upstream
riparian public lands-the situation apparently created by Pelton-
and yet California appropriators have prospered under the system. 3
Nor is the Pelton case an abrupt departure from prior law, for, since
the Winters case9 was decided in 1908, it has been an accepted
doctrine that the states do not own the waters flowing through fed-
erally reserved lands, rather, that the reservation of the lands impliedly
reserves the water needed for the purposes of the reservation. A
conservative and apparently carefully thought-out statement of the
effect of the Pelton case is that,
the United States by reserving land also reserves the water necessary for
the beneficial use of the land, and that all rights initiated after the reserva-
tion is established are junior to the United States' rights. The right of the
United States is neither riparian nor appropriative but is sui generis, a right
to protect the assets of the nation in the public interest as that interest is
defined in the laws of the United States.95
V. PROTECTION OF STATE INTERESTS
Any recommendations for the protection and reassertion of state
interests must take into account the delicate, dynamic balance neces-
89. Munro, supra note 57, at 222.
90. Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1964).
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 11; citing Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 55, 10 Pac. 674 (1886).
93. Ibid.
94. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
95. Goldberg, supra note 90, at 20-21.
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sary for the operation of our federal system of government at
maximum efficiency and must carefully assay the protection of legit-
imate national interests in the development of water resources. The
failure to take this balance into account and to respect such national
interests has been the major inadequacy in many legislative proposals
designed to vitiate the Pelton Dam decision, some of which would
summarily sweep away almost all effective national control of water
resources in the western states. 6 Some matters are so clearly in the
national interest that Congress certainly cannot be expected to
relinquish its constitutional power and legislative prerogatives in such
areas to the states. These interests include the protection of national
parks and monuments, the effectuation of international adjustments
through treaties, the protection of existing Indian water rights and
reservations, and the fostering of commerce through flood control.97
Quite probably the federal government could, through the powers now
held to be granted by the property clause, the commerce clause, and
the general welfare clause, if it were so disposed, proceed to develop
water resources without regard to the desires of the states.98 Such a
contingency is highly unlikely and would have incalculable effects
upon our federal system, but the existence of such a possibility serves
to illustrate that the constitutional issues of state versus federal
authority are now settled against the states; the future of state de-
velopments rests not upon constitutional protections, but upon political
and administrative decisions.99
The proper roles of the federal and state governments vis-a-vis water
resources, though never static, should be grounded in the following
general principles. First, the federal government is trustee of our
common welfare and as such it has a responsibility for the develop-
ment of our limited natural resources so as to promote the social
and economic welfare of the entire country.100 This responsibility
includes the task of making the democratic processes play as large a
role as is practicable in decisions involving the allocation of water
resources and the development of water plans. 10' It also includes
the duty to see that the benefits of water development projects do
not accrue only to the few and that state and federal comprehensive,
long-range plans for development of water resources are not wrecked
96. For discussion and critical analyses of these proposals, see Corker, supra note
87; Goldberg, supra note 90.
97. Bennett, The Role of the Federal Government, 45 CAiF. L. Rxv. 712, 721
(1957).
98. Goldberg, supra note 90, at 35.
99. WmrrE, THE STATES AND Tr NATioN 4 (1953); King, supra note 72.
100. Martz, supra note 77, at 627.
101. Engelbert, supra note 13, at 335.
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by the short-sightedness or rapacity of private interests. 02 Second,
the federal government should be able to provide investment capital
and technical assistance for local projects that will contribute to the
national economy, but cannot be financed at the local level. 03 Third,
problems involving our major river basins are regional in nature and
sound planning can only be accomplished at the regional or national
level.104 Fourth, the states can protect their position by endeavoring
to make as many local decisions as possible concerning water plan-
ning, and they should strenuously assert their claims to waters which
are also being subjected to competing claims from other states and
from federal agencies. 0 5 Only in this way can the competing demands
be recognized and balanced, a process essential to the viability of
our federal system. Fifth, the states must strive for improvement of
their water resources planning systems and the development of multi-
purpose planning, agencies. A state cannot protect its own interests or
the interests of its citizens without accepting the responsibility for
providing adequate machinery for the administration of water re-
sources. Centralized planning at the federal level is preferable to no
planning at all. Sixth, the primary administration of water resources
has been developed within the framework of state laws and govern-
ment and this administration and the rights and laws acquired and
developed thereunder should be disrupted only when absolutely neces-
sary' 0
6
With the foregoing general considerations in mind, we may now
proceed to a discussion of some specific recommendations for the
protection of state policies.
A. Conferring of Ultra Vires Functional Capacity Upon Corporations
The FPC should not be permitted to invest municipal or business
corporations or any state sub-divisions with functional powers that are
expressly forbidden those bodies by a state statute or constitutional
provision. This step is necessary if the states are to continue to
exercise their traditional roles as creators and regulators of municipal
and business corporations. It should be made clear that this restriction
on the Commission will not change the basic policy decision made in
First Iowa. An applicant for a federal license would still not be
102. Ibid. Indeed, one of the main reasons for the passage of the Federal Water
Power Act in the first place was the inability or unwillingness of states to effectively
regulate private interests. See Pinehot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water
Power Legislation, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 9 (1945).
103. Engelbert, supra note 13, at 335; Martz, supra note 77, at 627.
104. Martz, supra note 77, at 627.
105. Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAW & CONTENI'.
P.ROB. 325, 337 (1957).
106. Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48
CAL s. L. REv. 43, 56 (1960).
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required to show absolute compliance with state law or state permit
restrictions relating to the construction of hydro-electric projects, for
example, that a dam must not exceed a certain height. It means that
where a state has forbidden certain functions, such as the power to
operate a hydro-electric facility or the power to incur bonded in-
debtedness beyond a set limit, to certain types of corporations, the
FPC cannot endow those corporations with such functional capacities.
The distinction between lack of compliance with a state law regarding
the construction and maintenance of a proposed hydro-electric project
and a lack of functional capacity under state law will not always be
an easy one to make,107 but it is one that will protect the already
limited role of the states in power development, and the courts should
try to preserve it so long as it serves to protect state policy without
damaging national interests. This distinction would seem to be in
line with the "dual contror' contemplated by First Iowa,108 with each
governmental unit supreme in its own sphere-the state supreme in
the sphere of the determination of corporate capacity, and the FPC
supreme in the sphere of requirements for a license. It would also
seem to be consistent with the result reached in the Cowlitz dispute.
There the power which the state argued could not be conferred upon
a municipal corporation was the federal power of eminent domain-
a functional capacity expressly given to all licensees by the FPA. The
type of ultra vires functional capacity that is deprecated here is the
kind that is denied by the state and inures in the very existence of
the corporation and yet would be conferred by the mere granting
of the FPC license, although no provision of the act expressly granted
such a power to licensees. Where Congress has expressly granted a
power to licensees, it may be presumed that that power is to be
in addition to any state-conferred powers and perhaps in spite of any
state restrictions; but where no such express grant is given and the
mere granting of the license is relied upon to confer the additional
powers, no such presumption can be entertained. It is, of course,
possible that a state legislature might attempt to disable all corpora-
tions or private persons from constructing and operating hydro-electric
projects and thereby make a complete sacrifice of power development
in favor of other water uses. This sort of situation would be left to
the political processes of the state for correction; or, if the national
interest in power development in that area were compelling, the
107. For example, a state could provide that no Class A municipal corporation shall
have the power to construct and operate a hydro-electric project without securing
a permit from the Game and Fish Commission. Although cast in the form of a
functional disability, this is in substance a requirement for a state permit and should
be regarded as such by the courts.
108. See text accompanying notes 42-57 supra.
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federal government could undertake such power development on its
own initiative.109
B. Protection of Game and Fish
A state's protection of its fish and game is a peculiarly sensitive
area. The states seem to assert something akin to a proprietary right
in the wildlife within their borders, and such a right, in the form of
a trusteeship for the good of all their citizens, is within the police
power and is recognized by the Supreme Court."0 Because of the
unique proprietary interest and the often vociferous assertions of
conservation groups, a state's interests in its fish and game can be
interfered with only at the expense of a bitter struggle."' This is as it
should be, for the state government, with its sensitivity to local issues
and problems and its conservation agencies, rather than the FPC, is
the proper unit to judge when local fishery interests, either industrial
or recreational, should be deferred to power development. This is not
to say that the decision of a state commission or agency charged with
the protection of fisheries should be binding on the Commission, or
that the protection of fisheries is an absolute value; but rather it is
to suggest that the Commission should be extremely careful in weigh-
ing the demands for power development when fish and game conserva-
tion interests, long-range as well as short-range, hang in the balance.
C. Multi-purpose planning
Multi-purpose planning for the development of water resources
should, insofar as is possible, be left to the states. Some form of water
planning is now, or will become, necessary in every state and major
river basin because competing demands for water as an economic
good cannot be left to market forces for their resolution, that is,
priorities for the allocation of scarce water resources cannot be
adequately determined by spenders who, preferring one use over
another will pay a higher price for that use.112 This is so because
water, in many of its uses, cannot meet two requirements for a
marketable good: it is not packageable in the sense that it can be
differentiated as a commodity, and it is not appropriable in the
sense that someone can secure legal title so as to exclude other would-
109. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
110. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); Ceer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896). This "proprietary" interest or right is not absolute; it must yield to superior
national interests. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
111. The Pelton Dam case and the Cowlitz dispute are examples of this.
112. Ostrom, The Water Economy and Its Organization, 2 NAT. REs. J. 55-50
(1962).
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be possessors." 3 Although this is certainly true of such in-channel
uses as recreation and transportation," 4 it is not completely correct
with respect to a consumptive use such as irrigation or an in-channel
use such as power production. 15 But in the case of these latter uses,
the freemarket dynamic is impaired by the fact that these projects, to
be successful, require large-scale capital investment. Generally, such
projects tend to become quite large and to have a monopoly in their
particular service areas; whereupon they become subject to stringent
regulation as public utilities and the market ceases to play a major
role in their pricing and rate policies. 116
Once competing demands for water reach a certain level of intensity
and it becomes obvious that market forces will not adequately resolve
these demands, the only feasible alternative is planning for develop-
ment and allocation by a governmental agency. If no multi-purpose
state agency is created to serve this need, it is probably better for
the federal single-purpose agencies to fill the gap rather than to have
no systematic planning and allocation at all. But where state multi-
purpose agencies are in existence, as in California 1 7 and Oregon, 118
and are developing comprehensive programs, they should be allowed
and encouraged to proceed by cooperation from the federal govern-
ment, not interference from it. This is especially true since there is
no comprehensive federal planning and allocation agency, and it is
hoped that one will not be needed.
It is preferable that comprehensive planning and allocation
functions be delegated to a state multi-purpose agency because
of the multitudinous interests that are of primary interest to the
state and are only of secondary interest, if any, to the national
government. Such interests include irrigation, municipal uses, in-
dustrial development, fish and game conservation, and even power
development. The state is closer to these problems both in the
sense of political responsibility and in the sense of geographical
proximity. The state is also better equipped to handle the
plethora of administrative details that are involved in a compre-
hensive planning program and it is likely to be much more responsive
than the national government to the voices and votes of its citizens as
113. Ibid.
114. Professor Ostrom states that practically all water uses can be classified as
either in-channel or consumptive. For example, transportation, providing a habitat for
fish and game, and recreation are in-channel uses. Domestic uses, uses of water
in industrial processes, and irrigation are consumptive. Power production appears to
be a hybrid-little or no water is actually consumed, but a consumable product is
produced. Ibid.
115. Id. at 58-59.
116. Id. at 57-59.
117. Towner, supra note 80, at 739. See CAL. WATER CoDE §§ 120-235.
118. Ostrom, supra note 112, at 71. See ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 536.210-.560 (1963).
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the priorities and patterns for water uses shift and move in the kaleido-
scope created by engineering and scientific developments, climactic
changes, and population movements. Thus, once a multi-purpose state
agency, in response to the needs and desires of its residents and
water-users, has embarked upon a master plan for the development
of its water resources, maximum utilization of water with a minimum
of litigation and confusion will be achieved if the FPC will respect
that master plan and the private water rights vested thereunder.119
This does not mean that the FPC must stand by while national
interests are jeopardized; it should still perform its function of ascer-
taining whether proposed power developments are consistent with the
comprehensive development of the river basin in question and
whether they are in the national interest. It should not, however,
grant a license to an applicant who is acting in disregard of a state-
sanctioned comprehensive plan when there is no particular national
interest to be furthered or protected by the construction of the
project under consideration. Where an applicant is attempting to
act in derogation of a state plan, the Commission should grant the
license only upon a finding of a compelling national interest, such
as defense or economic development. A finding that a region or city
of the state involved is experiencing, or is about to experience, a
power shortage should not, of itself, be sufficient to justify the over-
riding of a state plan for comprehensive development, which, in theory
at least, will have weighed the contemplated power shortage against
some other conflicting use of the water and decided in favor of that
use.
D. River Basin Development
The above discussion concerning the deference that the FPC should
pay to a comprehensive plan evolved by a state multi-purpose agency
is subject to one major qualification: where a river basin is involved
that is of concern to more than one state, in the absence of some sort
of interstate organizational structure, the FPC should maintain its
primary responsibility for the planning for power development, and
the final decision as to the necessity and desirability of a project
should be the Commission's. The problem of how to best administer a
multi-state river basin is one of the most difficult problems of water
resources administration in the United States. Suggestions for hand-
ling the problem have included proposals for a network of Tennessee
Valley Authorities,'120 for multipurpose interstate compacts,'121 for inter-
119. See Towner, supra note 80, at 740.
120. See Engelbert, supra note 105, at 338.
121. See Zumam-mA & WE D'nD=u, THE INTmsTATE CoMrPAcT SINCE 1925 (1951).
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agency basin committees, 12 for national corporations with certain
powers over water resources delegated to it by interstate compacts,
123
and for leaving matters as they are, with the best result to be reached
by the push and pull of conflicting agencies. 24 Where an interstate
compact or TVA type agency is established, a state must subordinate
its interests to those of the interstate unit, trusting that its best in-
terests will be served in the long run by such subordination. In the
absence of such an agency, the need for paramount federal control is
obvious-planning for development cannot be left to one state for
disputes as to allocation do not respect state boundaries and cannot
possibly be adequately dealt with by a single state.
It may be argued that any stream, no matter how small, eventually
affects a major interstate river basin and therefore the FPC must
maintain its primary responsibility for planning and allocation over
all the streams within its jurisdiction even though a state has created
a multi-purpose agency for comprehensive planning and develop-
ment. This may well be true with regard to transportation, flood
control, or water needs on public lands-clear examples of paramount
national interest in any event-or conflicting consumptive uses,' 25 an
area with which the FPC is not directly concerned. But it is not true
of the in-channel uses which mainly concern the Commission or of
non-conflicting consumptive uses. Where these latter uses are con-
cerned, as was pointed out in the preceding section, the states as
sovereigns have a major role to play in determining the purposes to
which the waters flowing through their boundaries shall be put, and, in
the absence of interstate conflict, the Commission should respect
this role.
V. CONCLUSION
After exploring federal-state conflicts in the granting of licenses
for hydro-electric projects, it is clear that, thus far, the FPC has
won most of the disputes; and this is not altogether bad, for there are
certainly legitimate national interests to be protected here. But there
are also legitimate state interests to be protected, not out of concern
for the preservation of federalism as a political theory, but because
the state is the political unit with the primary concern and responsi-
bility for certain matters and because it can administer and regulate
122. See Engelbert, supra note 105, at 342. The basin committees are composed of
representatives from the various federal agencies operating in the basin, along with the
governors of the states concerned.
123. Note, 56 YALE L.J. 276, 295 (1947).
124. Ostrom, supra note 112, at 72-73.
125. A good example of conflicting consumptive uses making federal intervention
and control necessary is the dispute over the diversion of the waters of the Colorado
River for irrigation. See Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources
to People, States, and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 158.
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those matters with a higher degree of effectiveness than can any other
political unit. This paper has called for the protection of those
interests, for a redressing of the balance between the state and
national governments. This protection can be effectuated in differ-
ent ways in different areas. For example, in the area of fish and
wildlife protection, the sound administrative judgment of the FPC
must be relied upon; while in the area of ultra vires functional
capacities, the task must be left to Congress and to courts that will
assume the burden of making the distinction discussed above.126
However this protection is to be achieved, the possibility that it will
be achieved is real; for the relative powers of state and federal govern-
ments in water control are far from settled, but are still evolving in the
legislatures, in the administrative agencies, and in the courts.1
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126. See text accompanying notes 100-06 supra.
127. Engelbert, supra note 105, at 326-28.
